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1. Introduction 
 
Most industrialized countries redistribute income from the rich to the poor. Revenue from 
progressive income taxation and payroll taxation is distributed to individuals through 
monetary and non-monetary transfer payments. Redistribution policy reduces income 
inequality, from the perspective of the pre-government income distribution, and results in a 
more equal post-government income distribution. Table 1 shows the extent of income 
redistribution by the state for selected OECD countries. Inequality is measured by the Gini 
coefficient. It can be seen that Northern European countries reduce income inequality by 
about 50 percent, and Germany does so by 35 percent. Even in the United States, the 
reduction of pre-government inequality through redistribution is about 25 percent. 
 
Table 1: Income redistribution by the state in selected OECD countries 
Country  Gini Before Taxes 
and Transfers (1) 




Germany, 1994  43.6  28.2  -35.3 
Denmark, 1994  42.0  21.7  -48.3 
Sweden, 1994  48.8  23.4  -52.1 
Italy, 1993  51.0  34.5  -32.4 
United States, 1995  45.5  34.4  -24.5 
Note: All Gini coefficients are computed for household incomes using an equivalence scale elasticity of 0.5. 
Source: OECD, 1997.  
 
While the circumstances under which individuals prefer redistribution by the state are 
discussed intensively by economic theorists, empirical work on this question is rare (for a 
literature review see Corneo and Grüner 2001). However, recent papers have used “stated 
preferences” from population surveys to analyze preferences for political redistribution. 
 
Corneo (2001) and Corneo and Grüner (2000 and 2001) have used data from the International 
Social Survey Programme (ISSP) on 12 countries, including Eastern European countries, 
Germany, and the United States. They have analyzed responses to the question of whether it is 
the government’s responsibility to reduce income differentials between people earning high 
incomes and those on low incomes. Three competing hypotheses that may lead individuals to 
support redistribution policies were tested. The “homo oeconomicus”, or self-interest, effect 
measures whether individuals support redistribution because they expect to gain from these    3 
policy programs. The idea behind the “public values effect” is that there is a social welfare 
function that expresses individuals’ preferences for a less unequal income distribution. 
Finally, the authors test a “social rivalry effect”, which suggests that individual preferences 
for redistribution depend on the effect of redistribution on relative living standards. Corneo 
and Grüner (2001) find empirical support for each of the effects discussed. However, only the 
public values effect can be interpreted indirectly as evidence of inequality aversion. In this 
context, inequality aversion implies that individuals intrinsically prefer a less unequal income 
distribution independently of their own position in the income distribution. 
 
Fong (2001) analyzes data from the 1998 Gallup Poll Social Audit Survey. The independent 
variable used in this study is a summative scale of five questions on whether or not 
governments should reduce inequality. While Fong (2001) finds little evidence for the 
hypothesis that redistribution is driven by self-interest, social preferences seem to be 
important.  
 
The studies by Corneo and Grüner (2001) and Fong (2001) do not explicitly address the 
question of whether individuals are inequality averse. This is done by Alesina et al. (2001a), 
who analyze whether individuals are inequality averse by relating the inequality observed in 
society to individual differences in satisfaction with life.
1 Life satisfaction may serve as an 
indicator of individual well-being. If people are inequality averse, income inequality should 
have a negative impact on life satisfaction. Like Corneo and Grüner (2001), Alesina et al. 
(2001a) also used cross-national survey data and found that preferences for a more equal 
income distribution are stronger in Western Europe than they are in the United States. The 
authors argue that preferences for a more equal income distribution may not only be due to 
“taste”, but may also reflect something else in society, such as the level of social mobility 
(Alesina et al. 2001a, 19).  
 
The study by Alesina et al. (2001a) provides no evidence that Europeans are inequality averse 
independently of their own income. While the authors found the poor to be deeply affected by 
inequality, they found nothing comparable among the rich. Alesina et al. (2001a) did not test 
whether inequality aversion generates support for redistribution policies. 
 
                                                         
1 The paper by Alesina et al. (2001a) was published when the present paper was nearly finished.    4 
This paper links both questions. That is, we analyze whether people are inequality averse and 
whether inequality aversion is enough to lead people to support redistribution by the state. We 
use the German Socio-economic Panel Study (GSOEP), which provides information over a 
period of 14 years for West Germany on individual life satisfaction as well as information on 
several individual economic and socio-demographic determinants of life satisfaction. In 
addition, the use of panel data allows for control of unobserved individual heterogeneity and 
income mobility. For each year, pre-government and post-government income inequality is 
computed for 75 regional areas within West Germany. We interpret the difference between 
pre-government and post-government income inequality as the extent of political 
redistribution. Section 2 contains some theoretical considerations. Section 3 describes the data 
and the econometric model. The estimation results are presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 
5 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  Inequality Aversion and Preferences for Redistribution 
 
Economic theory offers a wide range of hypotheses to explain and legitimize redistribution by 
the state. For convenience, we summarize the main hypotheses with reference to three 
arguments as follows.  
 
The  first argument is one of economic efficiency. Individual preferences might be better 
satisfied by institutions such as the state if private transactions are affected by market failure. 
 
The second argument is related to self-interest. Redistribution policy is driven by elections, 
group pressure, rent seeking, and so on. A popular model is that of the median voter. Another 
is the theory of Rawls (1971). 
 
The basic hypothesis of the third argument is that people are (intrinsically) inequality averse, 
which means that inequality aversion enters individual utility functions. A possible 
justification for this is that individuals are altruistic or prefer a more equal income 
distribution, which then becomes something of a “public good” (see Thurow 1971 for a 
discussion). While the underlying motivation is of no interest to economists, whether such 
preferences provide additional legitimization (beyond efficiency concerns) for political 
redistribution is of interest. 
    5 
Distinctions can be made between these three arguments on the basis of whether inequality 
aversion is required. In addition, a major difference between the third argument and the other 
two is that, according to the former, some voluntary redistribution of income might be 
observed. Some points require discussion. 
 
The first argument does not need inequality aversion to legitimize redistribution policies. If 
people are risk averse and are willing to pay to reduce the risk associated with their ex ante 
income distribution, they might support redistribution under certain circumstances (see, for 
example, Barr 1998, Sinn 1995). If no private insurance market exists because of (for 
example) asymmetric information or interdependent risks, compulsory social security can 
increase the welfare of all individuals. If insurance is compulsory, it is possible to pool high 
and low risks and charge everyone the average premium. Thus, social security systems 
redistribute income from low-risk to high-risk people. Although the average premium is high 
for individuals with low risk relative to their fair premium (income redistribution), these 
individuals would agree to a compulsory social security system, because under such a system, 
they would better off than if they had no insurance. Awareness of this may lead individuals to 
register preferences for redistribution policies (that is, people favor social security systems) 
that are both independent of their economic situation (for example, measured by gross 
income) and do not require inequality aversion.  
 
Given the second argument above, people might be expected to support government policies 
designed to achieve a higher degree of redistribution if they expect to gain from these 
programs. Thus, redistribution is driven by self interest, in which case, support for 
redistribution should depend on individual income and social status, but also on income 
mobility. Recent research focuses on this issue in the context of the median-voter model (see 
Alesina et al. 2001a, b, Benabou and Ok 2001). Alesina et al. (2001a, 3) state that “this 
preference is mitigated by the fact that the poor of today may become the rich of tomorrow 
and they may not want to be in the future the ones who will support redistributive schemes.” 
Thus, the degree of social mobility—that is, the probability of becoming rich in the future—
should influence the degree of support for redistributive policies. However, as Alesina et al. 
(2001b) and Benabou and Ok (2001) have shown formally, the relationships between income 
mobility, risk aversion, and the demand for redistribution are much more complex. When 
income mobility tends to zero—that is, income uncertainty is low—the median voter demands 
a high degree of redistribution. Greater mobility reduces redistribution if expected income    6 
shocks move the median voter up the income distribution—that is, income shocks have a 
positive mean. If income shocks have a negative mean, the demand for redistribution 
increases. When income shocks have a zero mean and people are risk averse, greater income 
mobility increases the demand for redistribution. Alesina et al. (2001b) interpret this result as 
a variant of the “maximin principle” of Rawls (1971). 
 
In contrast to their findings for Europe, Alesina et al. (2001a) did not find any inequality 
aversion in the United States (US). One of their conclusions is that social mobility is higher in 
the US than in Europe. However, Burkhauser and Poupore (1997) and Maasoumi and Trede 
(2001) find evidence that income mobility in Germany is even higher than that in the US. 
 
Summing up, the models discussed in the context of the second argument need not assume 
inequality aversion in the sense of altruism. Moreover, in the context of these models, 
inequality aversion might be better interpreted as risk aversion. This means that aversion to 
(ex post) income inequality is nothing other than an echo of individual risk aversion to the ex 
ante  expected individual income distribution. Inequality aversion should be difficult to 
disentangle from risk aversion in empirical studies.  
 
The basic idea behind the third argument above is that people are inequality averse 
independently of their economic status. Supposing that people are inequality averse in this 
sense, one could ask whether everyone would support redistribution by the state. 
Theoretically, altruistic preferences could be fully satisfied by private voluntary donations. 
However, as Hochman and Rodgers (1969) have shown, the “market for charity” can be 
subject to failure in large societies, especially if it is the overall distribution of income, rather 
than the incomes of specific poor individuals, that affects the utility of the rich. In this case, 
no voluntary changes in the income distribution would be observed. This might constitute a 
quasi-efficiency argument for compulsory redistribution by the government. The government 
tries to capture individual preferences for redistribution by a tax-financed transfer policy.  
 
The following empirical question remains. How does the government’s tax and transfer policy 
match individual preferences for redistribution? It might be difficult for the government to 
capture preferences for a less unequal income distribution if individual preferences are 
extremely heterogeneous. If preferences over income distributions are homogeneous, perhaps 
because of a national consensus, a tax and transfer policy may fit individual preferences    7 
better. In either case, if government policy matches individual preferences for a less unequal 
income distribution and preferences are reasonably homogeneous, most individuals should 
support redistribution by the government, because this would increase their welfare 
independently of their economic position. On the other hand, if no support is forthcoming, it 
might be fallacious to conclude that people are not inequality averse. 
 
3.  Data and Econometric Model 
 
Our empirical approach is based on the idea of linking the perceptions of regional income 
inequality and the reduction of inequality by the government to individual data on life 
satisfaction. We measure inequality on a regional level. It can be assumed that individuals are 
affected more by inequality within their own region than by nationwide inequality. Regional 
inequality is observed by people as least as well as is nationwide inequality. In other words, if 
people are inequality averse in the sense discussed above, a regional measure of inequality 
should be at least as good as a national one. In addition, this approach has the advantage of 
increasing the number of observations on inequality in a national survey. If life satisfaction 
measures something akin to individual welfare, income inequality should have a negative 
effect on life satisfaction if people are inequality averse. A reduction in inequality through 
redistribution should have a positive effect on life satisfaction if people support redistributive 
policy.  
 
As in some other surveys, a question on life satisfaction is asked in the GSOEP. 
 
Table 2: Question on Life Satisfaction in the GSOEP. 
Question: How satisfied are you with your life, all things considered? 
Please answer according to the following scale: “0” means completely dissatisfied, “10” 
means completely satisfied. 
Source: http://www.diw.de/deutsch/sop/service/fragen/index.html 
 
For a long time, economists were very skeptical about satisfaction data because this type of 
data measures stated rather than revealed preferences. However, satisfaction data (and 
happiness data) have been used more frequently by economists in recent years. Satisfaction 
data has been used to analyze, among others, labor market issues (for example, Clark and 
Oswald 1994, Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998), public choice-related issues (for    8 
example, Frey and Stutzer 2000), income, income uncertainty, and well-being (for example, 
Schwarze 1994, Schwarze 2000). (See Frey and Stutzer 2000 for an overview.) A recent 
approach by Van Praag et al. (2000) links satisfaction with different aspects of life to a 
structural model of life satisfaction. The paper by Alesina et al. (2001a) that links cross-
national inequality to life satisfaction has already been mentioned. An early paper on this 
topic is by Morawetz et al. (1977), who compared the distributions of life satisfaction of 
communities with differing degrees of equality.  
 
Analysis of life satisfaction by economists, and earlier and more recent work by psychologists 
(for an overview, see Diener et al. 1999, Frey and Stutzer 2000, Frey and Stutzer 2001, Van 
Praag et al. 2000) have shown that life satisfaction is a valid measure of individual well-being. 
Frey and Stutzer (2000, 159) conclude: “Happiness is a ‘subjectivist’ measure of individual 
welfare, and is much broader than the way individual utility is normally defined.… While 
happiness is not derived from actual behavior, it is systematically and closely connected with 
generally accepted manifestations of well-being.” One could argue that life satisfaction not 
only measures individual utility, but also captures some aspects of a social utility function. 
Therefore, satisfaction data should show whether there are preferences for a less unequal 
income distribution.  
 
The data used here are derived from the GSOEP, which is a representative longitudinal micro-
data base that includes a wide range of socio-economic information on randomly selected 
households in Germany. The first set of data was collected from approximately 6,000 families 
in the western states in 1984. After German re-unification in 1990, the GSOEP was extended 
by about 2,200 families from the eastern states.
2 For estimation, we used an unbalanced panel 
for the years from 1985 to 1998. We concentrate on the West German population of working 
age (between 20 and 60 years of age). Respondents who answered in at least two years are 
included. 
 
Our econometric model is: 
(1)  irt i t r rt rt irt irt irt STATE IPRE Y X S e a n m b b b b + + + + + + ¢ + ¢ = 4 3 2 1  
Life satisfaction, S, of person i in region r at time t can be explained by a vector of individual 
socio-demographic characteristics, X, and by information on individual income and the 
                                                         
2 The GSOEP data used in this study are available as a ‘scientific use’ file (see Wagner, Burkhauser, and 
Behringer 1993). For further information, please contact the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), 
Berlin: http://www.diw.de/soep/.    9 
relative income position, represented by the vector Y. The coefficient vectors to be estimated 
are denoted by ß;  r m is a fixed effect for the region in which the individual lives,  t n  is a fixed 
time effect, and  irt e  is an error term.  
 
As responses to the life satisfaction question are from an ordinal scale, an appropriate 
estimator for our models is the ordered probit. However, the satisfaction scale may be used 
differently by different respondents (which is analogous to the ordinal–cardinal debate in 
utility theory). This may lead to correlations between unobserved characteristics and some 
included explanatory variables (for example, household income) and hence to inconsistent 
estimates of the parameters. However, the availability of panel data enables the model to be 
estimated as a fixed-effects or random-effects model, and thereby deals with some of these 
problems. In particular, if  i a  is modeled as a fixed effect, it is possible to control for inter-
individual differences in the scaling and anchoring of responses, intrinsic differences in 
scaling, and unobserved variables. As long as this heterogeneity is constant over time, the 
estimators are unbiased. Unfortunately, there is no readily formulation of a fixed-effects 
ordered probit estimator available (see, e.g., Greene 2000). An alternative is to estimate a 
random-effects ordered probit model. However, the assumption that unobserved heterogeneity 
is independent of the explanatory variables seems untenable. Thus, we decided to estimate the 
following models. First, we estimate a pooled ordered probit, in which we cluster the 
variance–covariance matrix by individuals to relax the assumption of independence. Second, 
we estimate an ordinary least squares pooled regression, in which the variance-covariance 
matrix is also clustered by individuals. The signs and significance of the estimated parameters 
are substantively the same in both models.
3 Third, we estimate a fixed-effects model to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity.  
 
It could be argued that the repeated measurement of life satisfaction in panel data has an 
effect on respondents’ answers. We control for this possibility by including a variable 
measuring the number of times a respondent has answered the question on life satisfaction.  
 
The following socio-demographic characteristics, discussed in the literature as potential 
determinants of life satisfaction, are included: age, age squared, gender, nationality, years of 
education, marital status, whether widowed, whether divorced, household size, number of 
                                                         
3 Hamermesh (2001) and DiTella et al. (2001) also used ordinary least-squares (OLS) to analyze satisfaction 
scales. They concluded that there are no substantial differences between OLS and ordered probit estimates.    10 
children, place of abode, whether employed full time, whether employed part time, and 
whether unemployed. Another important variable might be the health status of the individual. 
Unfortunately, there is no health measure in the GSOEP over the whole period.  
 
The individual’s income position enters the regression in the form of the log of equivalent 
household disposable income. We also include the relative income position of the individual 
in the form of the income quintile to which the person belongs. A dummy variable indicates 
whether the major source of household disposable income is a public transfer program. This 
might affect life satisfaction through stigmatization. In addition, we use the log of pre-
government household income as a predictor of life satisfaction. Including income as well as 
the individual’s income position in a panel data model may well control for the income 
mobility effects discussed in Section 2. Panel data estimation methods make use of the within- 
individual variation of the covariates and thus of changing income positions within the period 
under study. 
 
Two variables included in Model (1) are central to our research and should be discussed in 
more detail. IPRErt is the inequality of the pre-government income distribution in region r at 
time t. We compute inequality by using the regional income distribution for each respondent 
from the GSOEP. The regions are the 75 Raumordnungsregionen (ROR) of West Germany. 
The RORs are specific regional areas based on the administrative structure below the state 
level of West Germany (see Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung 1999).
4 Thus, we 
have r multiplied by t (that is, 75 multiplied by 14) observations on inequality.  
 
First, we compute Gini coefficients for the pre-government income distribution for each of the 
75 regions for each of the 15 waves.  






























Annual pre-government income Y
PRE is defined as the sum of gross earnings, capital income, 
and private transfer income across all household members.  
 
The variable STATE measures the effect of government tax and transfer policy on the pre-
government income inequality of the regions as follows:  
                                                         
4 The regional data can be obtained from the GSOEP group at the DIW Berlin (http://www.diw.de/soep/). See 













where post-government income Y
POST is defined as pre-government income minus income tax 
and payroll tax payments plus public transfer payments. Because both Y
PRE and Y
POST are 
calculated in the GSOEP at the household level, we use an equivalence scale so that 
households of different sizes are comparable. The scale chosen for our analysis approximates 
the widely accepted (revised) OECD scale. This scale assigns a weight of unity to the first 
adult, 0.5 to all other adults, and 0.3 to all children.
5 Descriptive statistics for IPRE and 
STATE are reported in the appendix. 
 
Model (1) enables a test of whether German people are inequality averse in general. 
Therefore, if inequality aversion is independent of an individual’s own income, IPRE should 
have a negative impact on life satisfaction. If people support the reduction of inequality by the 
state, the variable STATE should have a positive sign. However, if inequality aversion and 
support for redistribution by the government is not independent of income, Model (1) is 
insufficient. This is especially so if the second argument (discussed previously) holds. Thus, 
we estimate a model that includes interaction effects between the individual’s income position 
and regional inequality in place of overall inequality as follows: 




irt rt irt irt irt Q STATE Q IPRE Y X S e a n m b b b b + + + + + + ¢ + ¢ = 4 3 2 1  
        k = 1,…,5 
Q
k denotes the pre-government income quintile to which individual i belongs. The quintiles 
are computed in accordance with the overall pre-government income distribution. It can be 
argued, however, that using regional inequality on the one hand and overall income quintiles 
on the other could be misleading. In this case, it would be better to calculate the income 
quintiles in accordance with the regional pre-government income distribution. However, some 
regions do not have enough observations for the computation of robust quintiles. Hence, for 
an alternative test of the argument, we compute relative income positions based on the 
regional mean pre-government income. We computed five income position classes, to each of 
which about 20 percent of the population belongs. People whose pre-government income is 
less than or equal to 60 percent of the regional mean pre-government income belong to the 
first class. Individuals whose income is between 60 percent and 95 percent of the mean 
income belong to the second class, and so on. The highest (fifth) class includes individuals 
whose pre-government income is more than 165 percent of the regional mean income.    12 
 
As pre-government inequality and inequality reduction by the state are measured on a regional 
level, both independent variables are more highly aggregated than is the dependent variable 
(life satisfaction). This may bias the estimated standard errors of the independent variables 
(see Moulton 1990). However, the panel data estimation methods used in this paper control 
for fixed regional effects and thus alleviate the problem.  
 
4.  Estimation Results  
 
The empirical results are shown in the following tables. Only the estimated coefficients for 
inequality and inequality reduction are presented. The Appendix contains a table (Table A1) 
that includes all the estimated parameters.
6 Most of the estimated parameters accord with 
those in the empirical literature on life satisfaction. Comparing the results with, for example, 
those found by Alesina et al. (2001a) on the basis of a completely different data set for 
European countries, one is struck by the similarities, not only of the sign and significance of 
the coefficients, but also in their magnitude. However, there are also differences. Whereas 
Alesina et al. (2001a) found that divorced people have a lower level of life satisfaction, we 
found a positive effect of divorce on life satisfaction when applying panel estimation 
methods. Divorce is a dynamic event, the effect of which on life satisfaction can only be 
ascertained by using information from a panel study.  
 
As expected, life satisfaction increases with both the pre-government and net incomes of a 
household. The income position, measured by income quintiles, with the exception of the 
lowest income quintile, has no additional effect on life satisfaction. Compared with other 
individuals, those at the bottom of the income distribution are less satisfied with their life.  
 
We now turn to the impact of inequality and inequality reduction by the state on life 
satisfaction and well-being. For clarity, Table 3 summarizes the potential effects of income 
inequality and inequality reduction through government policy on the basis of the three 
arguments discussed in Section 2. It should be pointed out, however, that it would be difficult 
to disentangle the empirical results on the basis of the different arguments. For example, if we 
do not find a negative impact of income inequality (IPRE) on life satisfaction on the one hand, 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
5 The results discussed below are not sensitive to the equivalence scale chosen.     13 
but do find a positive effect of redistribution (STATE) on the other, it would not be possible to 
determine unequivocally whether redistribution is driven by efficiency or group interests. 
 
Table 3: Possible effects of inequality and redistribution policy on well-being and life 
satisfaction 
Argument Variable  Expected  sign  Comment 
Argument 1 
(Efficiency) 
IPRE  0  No inequality aversion required 




IPRE  0  No inequality aversion required 
  STATE  + 
- 
For low incomes 
For high incomes 
Argument 3 
(Inequality aversion) 
IPRE  -  Independent of income 
  STATE  - / +  Depends on whether preferences are 
covered by government policy 
Notes: IPRE is pre-government income inequality; STATE is the absolute percentage reduction in inequality by 
the government. 
 
The parameter estimates reported in Table 4 indicate that pre-government income inequality 
has a significantly negative effect on life satisfaction. There are no substantial differences 
between the different models. This result might be interpreted as an indicator of inequality 
aversion. However, the effect might also be interpreted as the influence of specific regional 
characteristics such as high unemployment or a “bad” socio-economic structure. Both of these 
might lead to higher pre-government income inequality. Unfortunately, data on regional 
unemployment rates and social assistance take-up rates are not yet available for the period 
under study. When those data become available in the future, it will be possible to combine 
them with the GSOEP. Note, however, that all the models estimated here control for fixed 
regional effects. Thus, if regional structures do not change significantly over the observation 
period, such effects should be fully controlled for.
7 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
6 The appendix also presents estimates from a random-effects ordered probit model. The model here is estimated 
using STATA 7.0 and the module ‘REOPROB’ written by Guillaume R. Frechette (see, http://www.econ.ohio-
state.edu/frechette/html/econ.htm). 
7 In addition, as Alesina et al. (2001a) have shown in their study of 12 European nations, the negative effect of 
income inequality on life satisfaction does not disappear when national unemployment rates are included.    14 
Table 4: Life satisfaction, inequality aversion, and political redistribution—estimates from 
panel data (selected variables) 





















Robust standard errors in parentheses. Variance-covariance matrix for ordered probit and pooled regression is 
clustered by individuals. 
Other variables: Age, age squared, sex, nationality, years of education, married, widowed, divorced, size of 
household, children, real estate, full time employed, part time employed, unemployed, disposable income (log), 
disposable income position (quintiles), pre-government income (log), public transfers, income taxes (percent), 
payroll taxes (percent), fixed time effects (14), fixed regional effects (73). 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level, 
** at the 5% level, 
*** at the 1% level. 
N of cases: 94528/11838. 
Source: GSOEP, 1985-1998. 
 
Redistribution by the state also has a negative effect on life satisfaction. However, the effect is 
statistically significant at only the 10 percent level in the case of the fixed-effects regression. 
 
Before these results are discussed in greater detail, further investigation is required. Is 
inequality aversion independent of the individual’s income position? It would not be 
surprising if people in a low-income position are averse to society’s income distribution. A 
finding that only low-income households are inequality averse would not provide strong 
evidence of overall inequality aversion. This would require that the life satisfaction of 
individuals in the middle and at the top of the income distribution also are negatively affected 
by income inequality.  
 
Table 5 reports the coefficients of the interaction terms between regional income inequality 
and the individual’s income quintile position.
8 Note that the income quintiles to which 
individuals belong are already controlled for by the inclusion of dummy variables (see 
Appendix, Table A1). In the ordered-probit model and the pooled regression model, not all 
estimated coefficients of pre-government income inequality interacted with the individual’s 
pre-government income quintile position are significantly negative. Income inequality reduces 
life satisfaction of individuals belonging to the lower and to the highest income quintiles but 
not for the middle income classes. Looking at the fixed-effects regression, however, all 
                                                         
8 An alternative procedure would be to include the main effects (IPRE, STATE) and four interaction effects. 
(The results are not shown here.) In this case, only the main effects are significant; the interaction effects are not.     15 
estimated coefficients are significantly negative. Thus, regional income inequality evidently 
reduces life satisfaction independently of the individual’s own income position. The life 
satisfaction of people in the highest income position is negatively affected by income 
inequality, as is the life satisfaction of people who are in the middle or at the bottom of the 
income distribution. This result contrasts with that of Alesina et al. (2001a), who find that 
while the poor in European countries are affected by income inequality, the rich are not.  
 
Although our results indicate a widespread inequality aversion in Germany, determining the 
possible causes would require further investigation. What are the reasons for such a 
widespread inequality aversion? Is a preference for more equality just a matter of “taste” or is 
there a broad consensus in society in favor of altruism? It is also possible that aversion to 
society’s ex post income inequality reflects nothing more than individual risk aversion to the 
ex ante expected income distribution. 
 
If pre-government income inequality reduces life satisfaction and thus welfare, can 
redistribution by the state increase life satisfaction? Table 5 shows a positive effect of 
redistribution on life satisfaction only for individuals belonging to the second income quintile. 
However, this effect is not statistically significant in the fixed-effects regression. Moreover, 
some estimated coefficients are significantly negative. The extent of redistribution by the state 
affects life satisfaction negatively for those people who are at the bottom of the income 
distribution. This might be explained by the possibility that redistribution is insufficient for 
those people. However, this effect is not found in the fixed-effects model.  
 
A significantly negative effect on life satisfaction of the magnitude of redistribution is also 
found for individuals in the middle of the pre-government income distribution (third and 
fourth quintiles). The “middle class” in German society represents those most affected by 
income tax and payroll tax and thus those who finance most of the social burden. No 
significantly negative effect of income redistribution on life satisfaction was found for 
individuals at the top of the income distribution.  
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Table 5: Life satisfaction, inequality aversion, and political redistribution by income 
quintiles—estimates from panel data (selected variables) 
Variable Ordered  Probit  Pooled 
Regression 
Fixed effects 


























































































Robust standard errors in parentheses. Variance-covariance matrix for ordered probit and pooled regression is 
clustered by individuals. 
Other variables: Age, age squared, sex, nationality, years of education, married, widowed, divorced, size of 
household, children, real estate, full time employed, part time employed, unemployed, disposable income (log), 
disposable income position (quintiles), pre-government income (log), public transfers, income taxes (percent), 
payroll taxes (percent), fixed time effects (14), fixed regional effects (73). 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level, 
** at the 5% level, 
*** at the 1% level. 
N of cases: 94528/11838. 
Source: GSOEP, 1985-1998. 
 
In summary, while German people are negatively affected by income inequality, they do not 
prefer the current extent and/or structure of income redistribution by the government. 
Moreover, it seems that the middle-income class bears something of an “excess burden” of the 
government’s redistribution policies. How might these results be interpreted? First, the 
government’s redistribution policies evidently do not match individual preferences. In    17 
addition, as discussed in Section 2, one explanation might be the existence of some income 
mobility (where income shocks have a positive mean). Thus, income shocks move the median 
voter up the income distribution. 
 
While we measured income inequality and its reduction by the state at the regional level, we 
calculated the individual’s income position on the basis of quintiles of the overall German 
income distribution. However, it might be argued that what matters is not the income position 
in the overall income distribution, but the income position in the regional income distribution. 
As already mentioned, we cannot use individual income quintiles at the region level because 
some regions have too few observations. However, we can calculate the individual’s income 
position on the basis of the mean regional income. The results are reported in Table 6. A 
comparison with Table 5 reveals no significant differences. Again, income inequality affects 
individual life satisfaction independently of the individual’s regional income position. The 
coefficient is quite large for individuals in the lowest income position (pre-government 
income of less than or equal to 60 percent of the regional mean pre-government income) and 
for those in the highest income position (more than 160 percent). Again, we found a negative 
effect of redistribution on life satisfaction for people in middle income positions.  
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Table 6: Life satisfaction, inequality aversion, and political redistribution by regional income 
position—estimates from panel data (selected variables) 
Variable Ordered  Probit  Pooled 
Regression 
Fixed effects 
Pre-Government inequality by regional 
income position: 















































Percent redistribution by regional income 
position: 











































Robust standard errors in parentheses. Variance-covariance matrix for ordered probit and pooled regression is 
clustered by individuals. 
Other variables: Age, age squared, sex, nationality, years of education, married, widowed, divorced, size of 
household, children, real estate, full time employed, part time employed, unemployed, disposable income (log), 
disposable income position (quintiles), pre-government income (log), public transfers, income taxes (percent), 
payroll taxes (percent), fixed time effects (14), fixed regional effects (73). 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level, 
** at the 5% level, 
*** at the 1% level. 
N of cases: 94528/11838. 
Source: GSOEP, 1985-1998. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
Using panel data covering a 14-year period between 1985 and 1998, we regressed life 
satisfaction, rated on a scale ranging from 0 to 10, on regional pre-government income 
inequality and on the percentage reduction in inequality achieved through tax and transfer 
policy.  
 
The results show that German people are strongly affected by pre-government income 
inequality. Increasing income inequality reduces life satisfaction and thus individual well-
being. We found this effect to be independent of the individual’s income position, which 
suggests an overall preference for equality among German people. A possible interpretation of 
this result is one of inequality aversion due to altruism, or alternatively, one of a more equal 
income distribution being a kind of public good.  
 
Redistribution through government tax and transfer policy evidently cannot reduce welfare 
loss that is due to income inequality. We found no positive effect on life satisfaction of the 
percentage reduction in inequality. Moreover, individuals in the middle of the income 
distribution are affected negatively by redistribution. The estimated reduction in life 
satisfaction that is due to redistribution might be interpreted as a form of “excess burden”.  
 
Further research could address the following questions. What is behind measured income 
inequality? Is it the extent of income inequality that lowers individual welfare or does 
something else that is correlated with income inequality reduce life satisfaction? Although we 
controlled for fixed regional effects, regional characteristics such as unemployment rates, 
social assistance take-up rates, and crime levels could usefully be included in the models 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Life satisfaction, inequality aversion and political redistribution – Estimates from 











































































































































































































































(0.0203)    24 










































Other variables: Fixed time effects (14), fixed regional effects (73). 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level, 
** at the 5% level, 
*** at the 1% level. 
N of cases: 94528/11838. 




Table A2: Description of regional areas (Raumordnungsregionen) for 1985 and 1998 
Numbers of regional areas  Numbers of individuals per 
regional area  1985 1998 
<= 30  22  15 
> 30 & <= 70  26  32 
> 70 & <= 100  13  10 
> 100  14  18 
Source: GSOEP, 1985-1998. 
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Source: GSOEP, 1985. 
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Figure A2: Pre-Government Income Inequality (Gini) West-German regional areas 
(Raumordnungsregionen) 1998 
 
Source: GSOEP, 1998. 
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Figure A3: Redistribution by the state in West-German regional areas 
(Raumordnungsregionen) 1985 
 
Notes: Redistribution is measured as Gini(Post-Government Income)/Gini(Pre-Government Income)-1. 
Source: GSOEP, 1985. 
 
    28 




Notes: Redistribution is measured as Gini(Post-Government Income)/Gini(Pre-Government Income)-1. 
Source: GSOEP, 1998. 
 
 